Introduction
There is a famous Chinese saying, according to which competition results in improvement 1 . Indeed, it is Chinese tradition to encourage competition in order to enhance innovation and improvement, especially using their intellectual property rights ("IPRs") as drivers. However, there have been numerous reports on IPRs infringements by Chinese companies, leading to doubts on China's ability to protect IPRs. Therefore, it is of primary importance to determine whether the new Anti-monopoly Law ("AML") enacted in 2008 2 and the State Administration of Industry and Commerce ("SAIC") Draft Guide on Anti-monopoly Law enforcement in the field of intellectual property rights 2012 3 ("Guide") will help protect IPRs or rather deepen the problems. It is argued that the regime has worked successfully to provide better IPRs protection along with other intellectual property ("IP") law regimes. However, it is also argued that there is room for improvement. Firstly, AML is inadequate in addressing the problems. Secondly, it lacks clarity in relation to Article 55 AML, thirdly, transparency in the relationship between AML and other applicable competition and IP laws, and fourthly, with the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of IPRs 4 ("TRIPS"). Fifthly, the Guide does not accord with the reality. Sixthly, the enforcement bodies lack guidance and experience in adjudication, and lastly, a clear division of labour in enforcement. Furthermore, China should continue to learn from various other international approaches well-established in the European Union and the United States
5
.
Part I of the essay will examine the present IPRs protection in China. In Part II, contrary to the myth that competition and IP law conflict with one another, it will be argued that both foster innovation and development, and enhance consumer welfare. The competition law regime in China will be discussed in Part III, with a specific focus on AML. The enforcement of the regime will be evaluated. Next, the E.U. approach will be discussed in Part IV, which China can consider adopting: the Block Exemptions approach from the E.U. on horizontal agreements, which will be discussed in Part V.
It should be noted that despite of the fact that competition and IP law are related to many other aspects, at the very outset alternative methods of protecting IPRs and other Chinese competition-. The present IPRs protection in China has improved significantly compared with that a decade ago. As China increasingly interacts on a global level and is part of the World Trade Organisation ("WTO"), its laws have been constantly evolved to provide IPRs protection and attract further investment. IPRs protection was featured in the Twelfth Five Year Plan (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) 8 with the pharmaceutical sector being one of the strategic industries that call for special attention.
However, China is still infamous for counterfeits and piracy, and was even labelled as the "theft of American IP", with branded goods, digital products, movies and music 9 , surpassing over US$1 billion 10 . Chinese firms have a strong ability to mirror foreign technology. Many foreigners are also concerned with legal and political non-transparency (to be discussed in Part III), and restricted market access, caused by preferential treatment to Chinese companies in tax and finance 11 . Such local protectionism is likely due to official and public concern about potential foreign dominance over Chinese businesses and a strong desire to build up the latter 12 , which can be seen from the Chinese foreign investment policies of favouring foreign technology transfer to Chinese companies 13 . As a result, it is less common that the foreign party can defend successfully against IPRs infringement by a Chinese party, and rarely the opposite is true: in the Tsum-Sony 14 case, Sony as the foreign party 6 Ian Harvey (2011) 
B. IPRs infringement impact
To IPRs infringement has a huge impact on the economy in China and the world. Chinese companies' innovations are stifled 17 because of piracy. Many foreign investors will lose confidence in dealing with Chinese companies. The gains of a lower cost of production do not outweigh the losses, and most importantly, China has the unwanted label as a piracy country. Foreign firms such as some IP-intensive firms suffered losses of up to US$48 billion in 2009 and had spent approximately US$4.8 billion to address the infringement problem
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. These are in respect of reducing profits, increasing legal costs of taking legal action and defending against IPRs infringement, damaged brand name and product reputation 19 . Like in China, their innovation is stifled and competition is reduced. Consumers will have less choice and consumer welfare is hindered. Therefore, there is every reason to better enhance IPRs protection, such as through competition law.
II. COMPETITION AND IP LAW -IN CONFLICT OR COMPLEMENTARY?
To many, competition and IP law appear to conflict with each other. In fact, they can be complementary and share similar policy goals e.g. encouraging innovation and development, and enhancing consumer welfare 20 . It is argued that competition law can help enhance IP protection.
There are controversies about the conflicts between competition and IP law. On one hand, IP law grants IPR owners the exclusive right of exploit their IPRs. This entitles them to exclude others from copying or commercialising an invention that falls within the scope of their IPRs
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. They can charge reasonable monopoly rates when others use or buy their IPRs and licenses to achieve exclusivity, and territorial and price restraints 22 . These rights are justified as IPR holders should, as a matter of public policy be entitled to recoup the substantial amount of time and effort invested in researching and developing their products and services
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. In fact, most conflicts between competition and IP laws stem from the uncertainties on, for instance, the extent of which competition policy on IPRs is about short-run efficiency aims, whether market power should be inferred from the existence of IPRs, and striking the balance on anticompetitive restriction in the exercise of IPRs 26 .
Both competition and IP law share the same policy goals of encouraging innovation and development, and enhancing consumer welfare 27 . Both competition and IP law aim to protect IPRs in order to facilitate innovation and encourage investment in researching and developing more new ideas. IP law, in particular, facilitates the commercialisation of innovation and encourages public disclosure when the IPR owner registers its IPR. Both spur competition among rivals to be the first to enter the marketplace 28 . Efficient production (static efficiency) and more innovative activity (dynamic efficiency) can be achieved with better consumer welfare. The legislative background of the AML is discussed in Part A. The AML and the evaluation of its enforcement are discussed in Parts B, C and D respectively. The position will be summarised in Part E.
A. History
As a result of China's reform and opening-up policies in the late 1970s, China's efforts in promoting fair competition and cracking down on monopoly activities have been successful first one is the AUCL, which prohibits 11 types of illegal conduct, including monopolistic conduct, such as abuse of dominant market position by public enterprises, predatory pricing, designated transactions by public utilities, tying, bid rigging and administrative monopoly, which is unique and common in China
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. Secondly, the Price Law 1998, which is the price control law on cartels, predatory pricing and price discrimination Many Chinese lawmakers hoped that the AML would provide a solution to pressing competition problems, though not necessarily directed at IPRs 47 but on mergers and acquisitions.
Such issue was raised in a hostile takeover and IPR dispute case between a domestic Chinese beverage manufacturer Wahaha and the French food company Danone
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. Wahaha was the target of a takeover bid by Danone, which simultaneously charged Wahaha for inappropriate use of its trademark. The chairman of Wahaha, Zong Qinghou, a member of the legislative body, the National People's Congress ("NPC"), and another member, Li Guo-guang, in the NPC, also from the Legal Committee and the Vice President of the Supreme People's Court ("SPC"), called for a proposal to restrict foreign investment from monopolising various industries in China through mergers and acquisitions
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. Therefore, the AML was implemented with the hope to protecting fair competition in China in general.
B. AML
To Among the eight chapters and 57 articles in the AML, it prohibits four types of activities: monopolistic agreements, abuse of dominance Articles 13 and 14 are about anti-competitive monopoly agreements. Article 13 prohibits horizontal agreements that fix the prices, limit the output or sales, divide the sale market or raw material procurement market, limit the purchase of new technologies . There are exemptions in Article 15 for the application of Articles 13 and 14, such as if the agreements enables the consumer to share the benefits derived from the agreement and will not severely restrict competition, and either improve technology or research and develop new products, upgrade product quality, reduce cost, improve efficiency, unify product specifications and standards, carry out professional labour division, improve operational efficiency and enhance competitiveness of small and medium sized entities, serve the public welfare, such as conserving energy, protecting the environment and providing disaster relief, mitigate serious sale decreases or excessive production during economic recessions, In this context, the phrases "business operators" and "IPR owners" will be used interchangeably as they refer to the same type of people in the AML. The first half of Article 55 sets out an exemption from the application of the AML, which IPR owners are not subject to such scrutiny for merely exercising their IPRs consistent with the laws and relevant administrative regulations on IPRs. The exemption is however, conditional 65 . The second half sets out the condition: if they engage in any conduct that seeks to eliminate or restrict market competition by abusing their IPRs, then, the AML shall apply. The plaintiff or the compliant bears the burden of proof to determine whether the alleged conduct violates specific provisions of the AML. When the defendant has recourse to the first half of Article 55 as a defense, the complainant must then prove the defense is not available by relying on the second half, that the conduct constitutes an IP abuse with anti-competitive effects 66 . A balancing analysis will be taken to see if pro-competitive effects are created by restraining the exercise of IPRs and whether such outweigh the anticompetitive effects caused by the defendant's activities before the defense is effective.
There are mainly two enforcement bodies to the AML and other competition laws: the Antimonopoly Commission ("AMC"), and three Anti-monopoly Enforcement Agencies ("AMEAs") 67 . Firstly, the Price Supervision and Antimonopoly Bureau of the National Development and Reform Commission ("NDRC") enforces against prohibition on abuse of administrative power in price-related matters. Secondly, the Anti-monopoly and Unfair Competition Enforcement Bureau of SAIC) enforces against the same but on non-price related matters. Lastly, the Antimonopoly Bureau of the Ministry of Commerce ("MOFCOM") administers and conducts merger reviews. These agencies are also respectively responsible for determining whether IPRs should be granted in the first place. On the judicial aspect, the IP tribunal of the Intermediate People's Courts hears civil cases relating to competition, with the same jurisdiction by the SPC, regardless of whether these disputes are IP related or not 68 .
There are also leniency programs that play an important role in investigating and sanctioning monopoly agreements
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. Whistle-blowers can report to the AMEAs but often this would have stirred suspicion among business partners. This is special and unique in the AML regime compared with other international approaches.
C. Enforcement
The enforcement of the AML by the AMC and the AMEAs has been a success. More officials were employed to intensify the enforcement efforts. Until 2012, the NDRC had investigated 49 pricemonopoly cases, few involving abuse of dominance, and 20 of them were closed with administrative penalties . Also, the AMEAs will not investigate a unilateral, unconditional or non-discriminative refusal to license, but those that are obviously unfair and discriminative, without justification or as a means of enforcing other restrictive terms or tying arrangements 81 .
The AMEAs have specific enforcement focuses. Abuses of IPRs were specifically mentioned in the National Patent Development Strategy as an area that calls for attention 82 . The SAIC for instance, focuses on monopoly conducts of public utility enterprises, such as electricity, water and gas suppliers, typical antitrust cases that cause serious impact on market competition, industrial monopolies and regional blockades On standard setting and development, there are no standard settings in China. Such standards are set by the State on a compulsory or voluntary basis, outside the AML framework 84 . There are concerns that standard settings or technology pools can create negative effects on competition, when they prohibit licensors from granting licenses outside of joint business operation, insert no-challenge and non-competition clauses in the agreement, charge exhaustive rates and demand grant-backs 85 , with no justifiable reason. Neither are there published guidelines by the AMEAs for the operation of standard-setting bodies ("SSOs"), patent pools or licensing, providing IPR holders with assurance that their standard setting activities would definitely not be subject to the AML 86 . However, the Guide clarifies that the acts of managing the joint business operation will not be automatically reviewed 87 , except when the acts constitute discrimination against other participants, restricting them from using the patents 88 . If the IPR holder participates in the standard setting and development but fails to disclose the IPR during the development process and its conduct has been monopolistic, its IPR claims will not be enforced 89 . An AMEA may impose a license on a reasonable and non-discriminatory basis as sanction. Scrutiny will increase further if the market position of the operator is more dominant and they unreasonably restrict the establishment of substitute operations 90 . Moreover, the Guide also suggests prohibiting agreements that fix patent royalties between competing business operators 91 . But it fails to understand that it has been the practice in China for operators to determine royalties among themselves. It remains to be seen how the law around SSOs will develop, as the AMEAs are very unlikely to intrude into the State's domain. The NDRC has also held many seminars with the E.U. and other countries to provide training for enforcement staff and even sent officials to learn in the E.U. on its anti-monopoly laws and enforcement work 94 . On that note, the enforcement of the competition law regime, in particular the AML is evaluated below. 
D. Enforcement evaluation
The AML has been implemented quite successfully over the past 5 years. However, most of the successes are not directly related to IPRs. There are certain aspects on implementing and enforcing the AML that had drawn attention for Chinese lawmakers for future amendments and improvements, such as 1) the inadequacy of AML itself, 2) lack of clarity in Article 55; call for transparency because of the 3) unclear relationship of AML with other applicable competition and IP laws, 4) that unclear relationship between Article 55 and the TRIPS, 5) the Guide not matching with the reality; 6) lack of experience and guidance in adjudication of competition law cases, and lastly, 7) the unclear balance of power between the three AMEAs.
Inadequacy of AML
The AML is not adequate in addressing the competition law problems facing China today. For instance, the exemptions under Article 15 may offer some protection for IPR holders, but very often they find it difficult to satisfy the burden of proof for the conditions required, such as consumer benefiting from the agreement insistence on using its patented replacement battery was held not to be an abuse of IPR; even though prima facie it was dominant over the digital market. There was no evidence of unnecessary technological strategies. SAIC is the AMEA for both laws, so it is likely that it will give the same or similar interpretation to the AML as that in the AUCL. In Shanda v. Sursen 107 , it was decided that the AML was not violated either. The case is about an unauthorized adaptation of an online novel by two avid fans who were disappointed by the ending. They decided to write an unauthorized sequel to it using the same characters, and published it online which became highly successful. They alleged Shanda to have abused the IPR while they had actually infringed the copyrights of the novel. These cases reflect that AML may be useless in enforcement as the threshold for any competition violation is too high. The AMEAs may have taken an overly-cautious approach, which made the enforcement weak.
Lastly, it is unclear whether the AML has a retrospective or prospective effect as it is silent on the issue. AML is thus inadequate to solve the competition problems.
Lack of clarity in Article 55 AML
The language adopted in AML is very general, including Article 55. Certain key terms are not defined, such as to what constitutes to eliminating or restricting market competition, IPRs, or the abuse of IPRs Another concern is whether Article 55 extends the prohibition on abuse of dominant position to activities carried out by non-dominant IPR holders 117 . If so, non-dominant IPR holders will be unable to engage in certain potentially abusive activities. The market share threshold test for the abuse of dominance in Article 19 AML will be irrelevant 118 . Also, it remains unclear as to whether dominant entities exercising IPRs are subject to the same competition scrutiny as dominant entities selling other goods or services, as IP indeed differs from other types of property 119 . Article 55 therefore requires further clarification.
Unclear relationship between AML and other applicable competition and IP laws
The AML does not explicitly repeal but coexists with many existing applicable Chinese competition and IP laws and regulations, such as those mentioned in Parts A and B above. Based on the general principles of hierarchy 120 , AML as the more recent economy-wide legislation take precedence over previous laws and regulations in cases of conflict, but to the extent they do not contradict it, they may apply concurrently . However, the Chinese representatives assured that Article 55 had not breached the TRIPS and the AML is fully compatible. Any further development on the issue remains to be seen.
Unrealistic Guide
Although the Guide has been useful in many ways in assisting the understanding and enforcement of the AML, in many other ways it is somehow unrealistic. Article 11 illustrates certain types of competitive activities, including cross-licensing 129 , without however realising the market reality that cross-licensing can also produce pro-competitive effects, such as reducing the risk of IPR infringements, saving monitoring costs and focusing on innovation . The European Commission ("E.C.") has examined the issue in the Pharmaceutical sector Inquiry, but it has not made an infringement decision on that clause 132 . It remains unclear whether E.C. will comment further for the Guide to reflect more of the market reality.
Article 17 of the Guide dealing with refusal of license states that AMEAs will not impose a duty to deal with competitors or other parties upon an IPR, but added that the unilateral refusal to license must be unconditional and non-discriminatory 133 . This will mean that the IPRs holder will only be safe from competition violation if he licenses to everyone or to none, or he will be taking the risks of being challenged by the AMEAs
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. This is absurd to the original purpose of the AML. Moreover, the Guide does not explain why individual assessments are taken applicable to all operators, when there should be no such requirements for non-dominant operators 135 . So the usefulness of the Guide remains to be improved.
Lack of experience and guidance in adjudication
The specialised delegation of the jurisdiction to the IP tribunals may mean that the tribunals have better capacity to deal with the IP abuse cases. But equally they are not better equipped in dealing with competition law issues that are new to them. Sometimes, the courts had not even referred to the matter to the IP tribunal. In Sursen v. Shanda and Xuanting, the regular court ruled on the matter without delegating jurisdiction to the IP tribunal 136 , but the parties did not challenge the jurisdiction. Indeed, the jurisprudence and capability of economic analysis on competition law in China are still in development 137 . Judges have limited training to understand the issues. There are no or limited precedents for the AMEAs and the judges to follow. The work of the AMEAs is rarely disclosed and the public always question about the reliability of their decisions, causing distrust among them 138 . Such is reflected in NDRC's decision on agreeing with an early settlement with China Telecom and China Unicom instead of imposing fines on them, which are state-owned enterprises ("SOEs"). The preparation of further interpretations or advice is likely to involve not just the AMEAs but also other enforcement bodies 139 . That means that delays are resulted in publishing the guidance. At the end, it relies on the bodies themselves to implement the laws 140 . It is useless if they do not.
Foreign business investors are often worried that the AML will be used abusively against them while the enforcement bodies and the judiciary turn a blind eye on the domestic and SOEs are concerned that the AML will be used as a defense to avoid or delay infringement actions involving Chinese parties, as the anti-monopoly investigation process once initiated is very time-consuming 142 . As discussed, Chinese officials often claim that China is plagued with foreign technology businesses that use unfair competition tactics 143 . Under local protectionism, judges tend to be biased in favour of the SOEs, supported by local committees or local people's congresses 144 . The authorities are unlikely to offend them because of the pressure that they would lose the tenures, benefits or even be removed for a verdict that the local government is not pleased with 145 . Additionally, local courts may suffer from significant funding reductions if they do not take government interests (which are about SOEs) seriously 146 . This lack of independence has a significant impact on the prosecution of pharmaceutical counterfeiters especially. Therefore, many companies, foreign and local, call for a shift in the enforcement focus to the SOEs as they are likely to abuse their administrative power to achieve dominance. Same standards should be adopted for both domestic and foreign businesses.
Unclear division of labour among three AMEAs
Lastly, the enforcement aspect of the AML in relation to IPRs is weak 147 . Firstly, it is due to the unclear division of labour among the three AMEAs. The AMC does not have substantive enforcement powers but formulates competition policies and guidelines, evaluates competition conditions, coordinates enforcement activities and reports back to the State Council
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. The AMEAs on the other hand, have strong powers 149 , including the power to inspect and investigate business and nonbusiness premises, and seize relevant evidence without a court order. However, the AML does not detail the structure of the AMEAs
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. All three AMEAs have been struggling for more power. Despite the seemingly clear division of responsibilities as discussed, the NDRC had once issued notice with respect of a case while the SAIC should have been the best candidate to decide. It was a case on the tying of wholesale of table salt with detergent washing powder 151 . Clearly it is a non-pricing practice which SAIC has the power to decide. deterred in enforcing what they consider to be relatively obvious anti-competitive domestic horizontal cartel activities, which have been the main focus of enforcement in other laws before the AML commenced. In relation to other types of agreements, this means that there is ongoing uncertainty as to which agreements can or will be challenged under the AML 153 . Secondly, the weak enforcement is because of the complex government structure. On a higher policy level, there are five levels of government and more than a dozen other governmental departments called "competition liaison agencies" across the geographical spread 154 , such as sector regulators, financial regulators and even the police and national security agencies. There are problems of allocation of enforcement responsibilities among the three AMEAs and other enforcement bodies with jurisdiction potentially overlapping and conflicting with each other 155 . The lack of clarity on legal enforcement in general has been an institutional problem in China which hinders the efficiency and effectiveness of law enforcement as a whole 156 . Due to the influx of parties seeking to obtain IPRs, the AMEAs had allocated a significant portion of their budgets and personnel to reviewing the IPRs applications. There were limited resources left to handle the investigation and adjudication of IPR infringement claims 157 . The complex division of labour among the AMEAs has worsened the competition enforcement and this has to be changed.
E. Summary
In summary, the implementation of the AML over the 5 years was sparingly successful. AML needs clarity and guidance for the application of the articles, especially on Article 55; transparency as to how different competition and IP laws and rules, such as the TRIPs interact with the AML and a better enforcement mechanism among the AMEAs and other enforcement bodies. The enforcement should aim more at the SOEs rather than foreign businesses. The NDRC and the SAIC had stated in August 2012 that they would increase transparency of their enforcement actions under the AML 158 . Some basic information of the investigation would be stated clearly to the public, such as what procedures to follow in order to apply for leniency, when the business operator under investigation will be notified, and how fines are calculated and determined. It remains to be seen that a single agency, fair and independent 159 , will be established to be responsible for the enforcement and implementation of both the AML and other competition laws 160 . Alternatively, specific guidelines on the division of labour among the AMEAs and other enforcement bodies will be available if the current model is kept. Conflicts between them can be reduced and capacity-building within each of them can be enforced. Lastly, a specific IP and competition piece of legislation may be desirable, instead of relying on Article 55 AML only, combining various applicable laws and regulations and with a clearer structure. 
